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IS CHINA STEALING OUR TECH? A LOOK INTO THE ROLE OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS IN US-CHINA TRADE RELATIONS

This thesis aims to further the current scholarship on Intellectual Property Rights (IPR)
and their effects on international trade and the US-China trade relationship more specifically.
The main analysis of this thesis is a quantitative cross-country analysis of over 100 countries to
see how IPR plays a role in international trade, while analyzing how the Sino-US trade
relationship fits into larger trends. This thesis aims to answer the questions as follows: What are
the current policies surrounding Intellectual Property Rights between China and the US? Does
increasing the strength of IPR laws influence imports? Does the strength of a country’s legal
environment influence imports? What is significant about this relationship in terms of current
Sino-US trade relations? I argue that China’s IPR strength has increased over time which has a
partial effect on the increase in international trade with the US. My results show that on average
both an increase in the strength of a country’s IPR laws and legal environment is associated with
an increase in imports.
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I. Acknowledgements1
II. Introduction
“China’s taking all our jobs!” “They’re screwing us over!” “China is a threat; we’re
going to win the trade war.” Chances are most US citizens have heard something along the lines
of these phrases in social media, news, or everyday life. Donald Trump vowed in his campaign
to address China’s role as a “currency manipulator” and the impact it has on the US (“Trump’s
Campaign Promises”). For decades, according to the World Bank, China has been gaining on the
US in terms of GDP, military strength, technology, etc. Their GDP growth rate has been nearly
10% every year, the fastest expanding major economy in history, which has lifted over 800
million people out of poverty. Although their growth rate has been slowly falling since 2010,
their percent of the world GDP has reached almost 20%, surpassing the US’ share of around 15%
in 2013. US citizens are noticing China’s growing influence even in everyday life, mainly “Made
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in China.” Nowadays, one cannot go a day without encountering a product that was made in
China. Meanwhile, the Trump administration has been challenging the perceived Chinese threat
by engaging in tariff battles with China, attempting to decrease the massive trade deficit US has
with China. Overall, tensions have been notably rising between China and the US because the
Chinese have developed into the international manufacturing powerhouse whose sheer output the
US cannot contend with. With this perpetually competitive and tense political economy,
international firms have many factors to consider when choosing to do business in the US-China
trade relationship, one pertinent factor is the host country’s Intellectual Property Rights.
A big concern multinational corporations and nations should have when they enter a
foreign country’s market is whether their ideas, technology, plans, processes, and other original
creations will be protected from theft. Intellectual property theft is essentially copying other
people’s inventions and ideas in a business setting, enabling the thief to bypass the costs, the
time of researching, and the time of developing the technology themselves. The rights associated
with intellectual property include copyrights, trademarks, and patents which prohibit all other
individuals or companies to copy, recreate, or imitate your new idea or product for their own
commercial gain. Thus, international organizations and multinational corporations may take a
country’s Intellectual Property Rights strength into account before entering their market. Despite
China’s comparatively weaker enforcement, the fact that it’s improving and growing, coupled
with low labor costs and other economic incentives for commercial success, there is the potential
for IPR to be a driving factor in the growth in the Sino-US trade relationship.
China has overtime enacted various Intellectual Property Right laws as they have grown
in the international economy, however enforcement of those new laws in Chinese society has
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proven difficult. Not surprising for a developing nation, the enforcement problems stem from
failures in not only the legal system but also the “…corresponding economic, political, social,
and cultural institutions. For example, these boundaries include local protectionism, low public
IPR awareness, a shortage of indigenous technology, and also shortcomings in the judicial
system,” (Cao 2014). Primarily, Chinese IPR enforcements lack consistency between the
national and provincial levels, in addition to having separate administrative and legal
departments that handle cases of IPR theft. This results in a lack of consensus interpreting their
newly enacted IPR laws for a society that not too long ago had no notion of private property
altogether. Despite the lack of IPR enforcement of Western counterparts, China has still made
serious improvements in IPR enforcement in addition to their constant updating of IPR laws. In
the Beijing IPR court specifically, there have been major improvements in the quality of IPR
judges who are increasingly receiving specialized training. The IPR courts are awarding higher
damages for IPR theft and have decided in 2015 alone three times the number of cases decided
by the Beijing IPR court in 2014 (Huang 2017). Along with these improvements, China has seen
a rapid exponential growth in patent applications as seen in Figure 1, practically doubling to a
total of 1.1 million patents filed in 2015. This growth in patents and improving IPR enforcement
could be an indicator for multinational corporations and domestic Chinese firms’ growing
confidence and desire for IPR protection.
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Figure 1: Annual Invention Patent Applications of Several different countries’ patent
offices from 1995-2015

Source: Huang (2017)

This thesis aims to further the current literature about Chinese Intellectual Property
Rights and analyze the impact they have had on domestic and foreign companies in China. In
light of China’s growing economy, the current trade war, and the rising tensions between US and
China, Intellectual Property Rights helps explain one aspect of this constantly evolving
relationship. First, I will synthesize the current and major literatures discussing Intellectual
Property Rights and scholars that more specifically focus on Chinese IPR. This will show where
some gaps in the literature are, allowing me to expand upon past scholars’ works. Second, I will
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add to the current literature by preforming a large-n quantitative cross-country analysis of the
IPR-trade relationship using a self-compiled dataset. Third, I will systematically go through each
part of the results and what implications those results have on the Sino-US relationship. Lastly, I
will conclude with the overall importance of this research, how this research can help future
scholars tackle IPR related questions, and possibilities for future studies.
III. Background
Before getting into the major literature on IPR, some background on the US-China Trade
relationship and the development of Chinese IPR is essential in obtaining a deep understanding
of this research problem. Since initiating market reforms in the 1980’s, systematically switching
from a centrally planned to a market-based economy has allowed Chinese companies to
capitalize on the country’s main advantage in the international economy: labor costs. Labor in
China costs a fraction, less than 10% of what the hourly wage is for the average US manufacture
worker (Liu 2018). As a result, moving production to China has become a common strategic
move for multinational corporations seeking to minimize the cost of production. However, low
labor costs is just one out of many economic factors that have led to China’s position in the
global supply chain. Nonetheless, producing both Chinese domestic corporations and
multinational enterprises’ products has resulted in China becoming a manufacturing powerhouse
in the world economy. On the road to becoming that powerhouse, the US has become one of
China’s biggest international economic partners, whose relationship has only grown since
President Nixon’s historic visit to China in 1972. As seen in Figure 2, The Sino-US trade
relationship grew quickly to 4,811,270,000 USD by 1980. This visit was the catalyst needed to
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normalize diplomatic relations by 1979 which opened the gates to drastic and exponential growth
in trade between China and the US.
Figure 2: Sino-US Trade, 1971-1980 (measured in millions of 2010 USD)

Source: Wang (2010)
Following China’s economic reforms in the 1980’s, major US firms entered China by
joint venture with Chinese companies or government agencies. These firms included: Coca-Cola;
American Express; American Motors; AMF, Inc.; General Foods; Beatrice; Gillette; Pepsi-Cola;
Eastman Kodak; AT&T and many others. During the 1980’s their economic relationship grew
annually around 44% each year, which was the beginning of the trade imbalance being shifted to
China (Mertha 2005). With the immense growth, by 1984 the US was already China’s third
largest trading partner, while China was the US’ fourteenth largest partner (Wang 2010).
Although the trade volume was beneficial to both countries especially the US with regards to the
Cold War necessitating massive amounts of capital, this sustained growth was coupled by US
anxiety over the beginnings of a trade deficit with China. This deficit would soon snowball to
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over 200 billion USD by mid-2000’s and would rapidly become a major point of friction in later
years. Even so, China would soon become the US’ second largest trading partner by 2005 with
their combined trade volume reaching levels of around 300 billion USD. The US exported
mainly raw materials and sophisticated technology while China exported both common
commercial goods like toys and power equipment (Wang 2010). During this time of economic
expansion in their trade relationship, only providing a simplification of decades of complicated
political and economic history, one important factor along the way has been the development of
China’s Intellectual Property Rights.
Figure 3: Sino-US Trade, 1981-1990 (measured in millions of 2010 USD)

Source: Wang (2010)
Beginning in 1982, China established The Trademark Law of the People’s Republic of
China, their first modern legal system for protecting Intellectual Property Rights. According to a
brief history of Chinese IPR written by Huang (2017), China developed patent laws in 1984.
Then in 1987, China entered IPR into its basic civil law for the rights of citizens, created
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Copyright Law in 1990, and made further additions throughout the 1990’s. The addition of
Intellectual Property laws into the Chinese legal system happened simultaneously as they entered
several international organizations and treaties. China’s IPR was again revamped in 2000 so that
it could join the World Trade Organization in 2001, abiding by the WTO’s agreement on Trade
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) (Awokuse 2010b).
Since then, the US has consistently been pushing China to increase their Intellectual
Property Right strength in written laws and especially in enforcement. In April of 2007, the US
formally requested dialogue with China concerning China’s failure to adhere to the TRIPS
guidelines for IPR. The US filed a complaint with the WTO against China regarding the TRIPS
agreement. Their reasons being that US firms report having significant economic losses due to
local companies stealing their intellectual property and not being properly reprimanded by the
Chinese authorities (Huang 2017). The formal complaint filed by the US had the following
concerns: “(1) The high thresholds for criminal procedures and penalties in the intellectual
property area, (2) the failure of the Chinese customs authorities to properly dispose of infringing
goods seized at the border, (3) the denial of copyright protection to works that have not been
authorized for publication or dissemination within China, and (4) the unavailability of criminal
procedures and penalties for infringing activities that involved either reproduction or distribution,
but not both” (Yu 2011). The WTO compiled a panel to address the complaint and created a
report explaining their final decisions. In the report, WTO sided with China on the first claim,
sided with US on the third claim, had a split decision on the 2nd and 4th claim. Right after
publication, both countries called the results a victory even though the report was not solely one-

Chester 9

sided (Yu 2011). To this day, Intellectual Property laws have been a talking point for Sino-US
diplomatic negotiations on trade and will continue to be for years to come.
IV. Literature Review
Knowing that IPR is a controversial issue for the Sino-US relationship, a more in-depth
understanding about IPR and how scholars have studied this issue is essential. Intellectual
Property Rights can generally be split up into three different categories: patents, copyrights, and
trademarks. Patents protect inventions and products, copyrights protect creative intellectual
ideas, and trademarks cover commercial logos, phrases, and words associated with a company’s
product or service. These forms of Intellectual Property Rights give the owner the legal right to
exclude anyone else from making, using, selling, and importing the owner’s invention for a
certain number of years. Essentially, this gives the owner a limited monopoly period to use their
invention or idea before it enters the public domain. Those are the basic principles of Intellectual
Property Rights according to the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO). Additionally,
firms doing business internationally who want to protect their technology and ideas in several
countries will need patents in each country they are operating in to maximize protection because
patents do not have international coverage. This complication makes it difficult for scholars to
analyze the relationship between IPR and trade because there can be vastly different laws,
interpretations, and enforcement practices between countries.
Previous studies have measured and defined IPR strength as their independent variable in
a variety of different ways including the number of patent applications, IPR indexes,
contents/wording of IPR legislation, and various kinds of enforcement. For example, Smith
(2001, 2002) uses cross-country data on the strength of foreign patent rights while Awokuse
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(2010a, 2015) and Falvey (2009) use an IPR index generated by Ginarte and Park (1997). Their
index uses data from 110 countries for the period 1960-1990 to determine how strongly patent
rights will be protected. Li (2015) separates IPR into its explicit legislation and the details of its
enforcement. Li measures the legislation strength similarly to other IPR indexes like Ginarte and
Park (1997) by summating several factors including: the extent to which different inventions are
covered, membership in international agreements, provisions for loss of protection, and results of
IPR court cases. Overall, most political science studies on IPR strength are focused on patent
rights in target countries and or use an index synthesizing the legislation, the enforcement, or
both in conjunction.
In addition to variation in how IPR strength is measured as an independent variable, trade
relationships are measured just as variably throughout IPR scholarship to include studies on
affiliate sales, licensing, innovation, Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), as well as imports and
exports. These dependent variables are major modes of transactions for international businesses
and are helpful for analyzing the nuances of IPR strength’s effects on trade (Awokuse 2010b).
Affiliate sales refers to firms setting up a proxy in a foreign nation to sell their products while
licensing refers to giving another company permission to produce and sell their product with a
specified payment. IPR strength’s effect on innovation as studied by Cho et. al. (2017) shows us
that the number of patent applications from a company can indicate its level of innovation. They
found that increased IPR strength does not increase innovation, but the effect is much less for
international firms than domestic firms. Foreign Direct Investment is simply an investment by a
foreign company in a domestic company to gain partial or even full ownership of the domestic
company. To analyze participation of a foreign firm in a country necessitates considering these
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other forms of servicing a foreign market. Awokuse (2015), finds that the increasing Intellectual
Property Right strength from 1994-2006 has a positive relationship with US FDI. These
variations in how IPR scholars measure and explain the trends in trade are connected to each
other through some essential ideas in economics.
There are two main economic models that IPR scholars consider when analyzing IPR’s
impact on trade, no matter if they are focusing on legislation, enforcement, or another aspect.
The two most notable are the market power and market expansion effects (Maskus and Penubarti
1995). Each frame explains why an increase in IPR protection can either have a positive or
negative relationship with exports and imports depending on the imitative ability of the
importing country (Smith 2001, 2002). Firms have a tradeoff to manage between greater market
power or market size, choosing market power usually causes a decrease in output while choosing
greater market size results in increasing output. The market power concept refers to when a firm
can raise its prices without consequence because of little competition or ability of competitors to
produce similar products. IPR can create a market power effect because of the monopoly power
given to a firm for a limited time. When a firm has a monopoly over a product, with no
competition from other firms creating substitutive products, that firm can raise its prices without
losing any customers because customers have no other options. On the other hand, the market
expansion effect is stronger for countries with higher imitation abilities because increased IPR
protection makes it harder to imitate and firms tend to increase their output to occupy more of
the market. Essentially, if no one else can sell a product similar to yours, you can also increase
output as long as you have monopoly power over the market (Smith 2002).
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Many scholars have used these two effects in their analysis of IPR on bilateral trade to
explain the interaction relationship of IPR and bilateral trade. The market power decreases trade
while market expansion increases it. Market power is shown to have a larger effect in countries
with weaker imitative abilities while market expansion affects countries with strong imitative
ability when IPR strength increases (Awokuse 2010a, 2015, Smith 2001, 2002, Falvey 2009). A
country’s imitative ability is its capability to copy another firm’s technology or manufacturing
process. Therefore, if a developing country has gone through or is going through
industrialization and has a higher quality of education, then it is likely to have strong imitative
abilities because people have more potential to imitate foreign technology, create their own
version, and integrate those ideas into their domestic products. This imitative ability is measured
by R&D expenditure as a percent of GDP, per capita number of R&D scientists, technicians,
engineers, and educational level (Smith 2002). Higher R&D expenditure and specialists’
education level equates to a higher imitative ability of that country. Essentially, countries that
struggle to invest in R&D and have low education levels are considered to have weak imitative
abilities. As a result, Awokuse (2010b, 2015), Smith (2001,2002), and Falvey (2009) agree that
the market power effect dominates in countries with weaker imitative ability because one firm
with monopoly power can decrease output and raise prices while maintaining customers because
customers have no other options. On the other hand, the market expansion effect is dominant in
importing to countries that have a higher level of imitative ability because increased IPR
protection makes that imitation harder and firms can increase output if they have monopoly
power from patents. Overall, scholars tend to use the market power and expansion effects in
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terms of imitative ability to act as a framework to explain their findings because IPR protection’s
impact on trade varies drastically for different countries and industries.
In studying the contradictory market power and expansion effects, scholars tend to
choose either a large group of countries or a specific relationship or country to focus their study.
Studies done on a large group of countries, utilizing IPR indexes, have found wide variation in
the effects of IPR on trade, FDI, and innovation. This variation has led scholars to believe effects
of IPR on trade and other dependent variables must be isolated and looked at on case-by-case
scenarios. For example, the index generated by Ginarte and Park (1997) uses a scoring method
that places weights for various criteria in an arbitrary manner. The depth and breadth of their
index has been vital to the study of IPR; however, it might not be enough to explain how changes
in patent laws through the years affect a specific country’s economic viability (Awokuse 2010a).
In IPR scholarship, there is a wide variation in the chosen subjects to study, whether it be a group
of countries or a specific country.
Despite the variation in chosen countries and target industries, IPR scholarship has
consistently stayed at a higher level of aggregation which leads this thesis to continue in a similar
manner. Studies looking at the effects of strengthening IPR on exports and imports generally
study higher levels of aggregate data from an index and then control for a multitude of variables
including GDP, policy barriers, imitative ability, etc. (Falvey 2009). Scholars then might isolate
a target industry they are interested in, like pharmaceuticals, manufacturing, or high-end
technology. For example, knowledge intensive industries like the phone industry has a stronger
relationship with growing IPR because they rely more on patents to protect their cutting-edge
products. Manufacturing or textile industries have weaker relationships with IPR because of the
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high saturation of those markets (Doanh 2007). This specification tends to lower the level of
aggregation in the data IPR scholars use (Smith 2002). Thus, the more specifications that IPR
scholars use in their analysis, the lower their aggregation of data tends to be.
The research in this thesis differs from the current literature in several ways. The
important differences include the time period and indexes used for IPR data. The current
literature on IPR has a plethora of studies that use IPR indexes synthesizing data from many
countries, controlling for imitative ability, GDP, R&D expenditure, industry, etc. I intent to
include as many of those control variables as is available to me. As I’ve mentioned, the most
notable IPR index is from Ginarte and Park (1997). The reason I am not using that index is
because it is already more than twenty years old and my purpose for this thesis is to update the
current literature with the most current and reliable data to see if the trends that previous scholars
discovered hold true as time progresses. The time period for the current literature is either a
specific year, or several decades in the late 20th century. This thesis will use data from 2017, the
most recent trade and IPR data that I have encountered in a study. Even though I’m choosing a
different index and time period, one important similarity is that for trade data I intend to use a
high level of aggregation consisting of country-level import data which is consistent with the
current literature.
Even though I was unable to find data on the industry level, there have been several
studies that have touched upon how the strength of the relationship between IPR and bilateral
trade varies among industries which is important to note. The knowledge-intensive industries
like computers, phones, and pharmaceuticals require large R&D investments to be competitive,
creating new technologies and cutting-edge products constantly. Similarly, these industries rely
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on IPR to offset the costs of producing such new technology and the processes for making them.
If their competitors could instantly reproduce their new ideas, then the creators would lose
money from the time and effort it took to actualize their ideas. Industry-level data is harder to
obtain from government databases and is further limited in the most current datasets in the World
Bank. Even though I am unable to separate imports by industry, I will be including this in my
discussion of possible future research. Overall, the variation between industry imports can help
better understand the current state of how IPR affects Sino-US trade.
This lower level of aggregation and industry specification brings up questions such as:
does increasing Intellectual Property Rights benefit domestic or foreign firms more? How does
the strength of a country’s legal system affect its imports? In a country with strong imitative
ability, does the market expansion effect of IPR remain stronger for high-end technology firms?
What significance do the results have for the current state of Sino-US trade relations? These are
the driving questions of my research which looks to analyze the impact strengthening IPR laws
and legal environment have on country’s imports. This update to the current literature will aid in
the complex relationship between business and government. So far, scholars have determined
IPR has a complicated relationship with trade, the direction and strength being highly
circumstantial. IPR can have both positive and negative relationships with various economic
variables, categorized by the market power and expansion effects. I intend to test how those
effects play out in the 21st century.
V. Theory/Hypothesis
The specific variables I want to focus on in this thesis are legal environment (IV1), IPR
strength (IV2), and imports (DV), the independent and dependent variables respectively, which
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will be framed using the market power and expansion effects. When a firm prepares to start
selling a new product or use a newly developed technology, the first thing executives can seek is
a patent to protect their Intellectual Property and shield the huge R&D investments they made
from the risk of becoming wasted. Patents and other Intellectual Property Rights give firms the
ability to sell their products more freely because IPR provides firms with a legal channel to
prosecute intellectual property theft claims as well as promulgates a strong deterrent from
copying others’ commercial ideas within a society. This relationship is actualized when a country
enforces its Intellectual Property Rights. If a government signs a strong new law into existence,
but lacks proper implementation efforts afterwards, the law’s effects will not be as significant.
On the other hand, a strong law with strict enforcement can perpetuate significant changes in
how a society functions. Therefore, I contend that IPR strength and enforcement plays a key role
in international trade. When a firm applies for a patent and is granted the legal protection from
intellectual property theft, a reasonable person would expect that the respective government will
have institutions and accessible resources for firms to pursue proper litigation of intellectual
property theft claims. That theory will be the basis for how my independent variables, legal
environment and IPR strength, are measured. This enforcement component will be incorporated
along with other legal structures in measuring the overall strength of a country’s legal
environment while IPR strength will integrate the existence of some IPR laws, their
comprehensiveness, and how they compare to international standards like those put forward by
the WTO and TRIPS. Chinese IPR strength, enforcement, and Sino-US trade are arguably the
most imperative variables in this intersection between politics and business; the variation in this
relationship offers valuable insight into how my research design will address the relationship.
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With an established legal channel and investigative initiative, a firm’s success due to
engagement or lack of participation in Intellectual Property Rights can also have varying degrees
which should be considered in my research. A firm can theoretically take advantage of the
temporary monopoly gained by Intellectual Property Rights and utilize either the market power
or market expansion effects explained previously. However, without legal protections from
intellectual property theft, a firm is exposed and vulnerable to predatory companies that intend to
copy other firms’ innovations for their own commercial gain. This theft can lead to unfair
competition and the inability of a firm to compete with companies’ lower prices because they
didn’t need to make a huge investment into R&D to develop the product. Thus, Intellectual
Property Rights is logically connected with exports and imports through an enforcement
mechanism. Measuring enforcement will be explained further in my research design where I will
integrate it into the legal environment variable. Having established some theoretical background
to the relationship between legal environment, IPR strength, and international trade, I intend to
use two similar theories to the current literature in my analysis of this relationship:
Hypothesis 1 (H1): In a comparison of countries, increasing the strength of the legal
environment will result in an increase of imports to those countries.
Hypothesis 2 (H2): In a comparison of countries, increasing the strength of Intellectual
Property Rights protection will result in an increase of imports to those countries.
Variation in this relationship can first be illustrated by how IPR laws are “strong”, what
does a strong legal environment look like in society, as well as the varying degrees of firm’s
output after attaining intellectual property protections; all of which could impact the constantly
shifting relationship between the Chinese and US governments. Strong IPR can be measured by

Chester 18

content analysis of patent laws’ comprehensiveness and alignment with international standards.
In addition, some scholars use the number of patents filed for a specific country as a proxy
variable to indicate the growing strength of their IPR regime. For example, in order to receive a
patent, under Chinese Patent Law, the invention or technology must contain something of
“novelty, inventiveness, and practical applicability” (Shang-jin 2010). Novelty is described as a
characteristic of technology or an idea that has not been developed or seen in publications
domestically and abroad, has not been known in the public domain, and has not been filed
previously (Shang-jin 2010). This concept of “novelty” is a rather comprehensive idea, even
standalone, because of its incorporation of foreign public domains as well as domestic
knowledge in China. In my research I intend to capture the increasing comprehensiveness and
specificity of IPR as well as a country’s steady alignment with international standards by using
an updated and current IPR index which incorporates the aforementioned concept of what IPR
strength is. The measurement of the independent variable will be explained further in the
research design section.
The degree of enforcement and overall legal environment in China is a second key
mechanism and intervening variable for how IPR could potentially impact trade flow. If a firm
has a patent, discovers other companies are using their technology, and files suit against them,
only with trained judges and lawyers can there be an effective litigation of the claim. If a firm
wins a case, Chinese authorities must enforce the decision to punish wrongdoers and effect
change in firms’ operations. Certain institutions and legal infrastructures such as specialized IP
courts and government patent offices that facilitate IP theft litigations and punishments are
essential in manifesting a relationship between IPR laws and trade flows. Besides having a
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proper legal channel to prosecute IP theft claims, police and other authorities can take an active
initiative into investigating possible IPR violations which would only increase substantially the
level of IPR enforcement in Chinese society. This mediating variable I call “legal environment”
will have to be examined in my research to capture the relationship between IPR and Sino-US
trade accurately.
VI. Research Design
a. Large-N Quantitative Cross-country Analysis
In order to answer my research questions, test my two hypotheses, and consider all
important variations I intend to utilize data from 2017 to carry out a large-N quantitative crosscountry analysis of legal environment, IPR strength, and imports to address Hypothesis 1 (H1)
and Hypothesis 2 (H2). This high level of aggregation will grant insight into the current
relationship between IPR and trade in a broad context. For this analysis I will not be following
previous scholars that have used the Gravity Equation and several indexes, most notably the
Ginarte and Park (1997) IPR index, to analyze IPR with various dependent variables in
numerous countries (Awokuse 2010a, 2015, Falvey 2009). In my quantitative analysis I will be
using previous theories on IPR and trade to update the existing literature, seeing if there are any
significant differences or similarities with earlier scholars’ results discussed in the literature
review. A more current Property Rights Index will be used instead of Ginarte and Park’s index in
order to update the current literature on IPR with the most recent and robust data available. I
will be performing bivariate and multivariate regressions instead of the Gravity Equation because
I am unable to obtain all the necessary data to calculate that equation. I will strengthen my
analysis with as many control variables as available to me consistent with the relevant IPR

Chester 20

literature. This extension of previous scholarship of Intellectual Property Rights’ impact on trade
allows me to place the Sino-US relationship into a larger narrative of IPR.
In order to operationalize and measure my independent variables, legal environment and
IPR strength, I will use Property Rights Alliance’s International Property Rights index. This IPR
index, which contains data from 129 countries, 94% of the world’s population, and 98% of the
world’s GDP, is necessary to perform bivariate and multivariate regressions. Their reports are
from every year from 2007 to 2019. Their “Legal & Political Environment” component will be
used to represent my first independent variable, legal environment. My second independent
variable will be measured using the IPRI’s “Intellectual Property Rights” component which is
split up into patent protection and copyright piracy. However, I only have complete access to
their 2017-2019 datasets. To have a clear picture of how Property Rights Alliance’s IPR index is
constructed, please see Figure 4 below.
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Figure 4: Web Diagram and Equation of Property Rights Alliance’s International Property
Rights Index (IPRI)

Source: International Property Rights Index 2019 Report

The Legal & Political Environment component of the IPRI index consists of four
categories: (1) Judicial Independence, (2) Rule of Law, (3) Political Stability, and (4) Control of
Corruption. The IPRI index took the Global Competitiveness index from the World Economic
Forum’s 2018 report. The questions for this category include: In your country, how independent
is the judicial system from influences of the government, individuals or companies? The Rule of
Law component measures whether individuals believe and support the rules of their society,
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specifically contract enforcement, property rights, police, likelihood of crime and violence, and
the courts. The IPRI index sourced the Rule of Law and the Political Stability component from
the World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators. Political Stability increases incentives to
own and pursue ownership and management of property. Thus, the less politically stable a
country is the less likely citizens will pursue property and have trust in their government not to
violate their rights. The Control of Corruption component combines several indicators from the
same source to evaluate the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain (IPRI
Index Report 2017).
The Intellectual Property Rights component of the index is comprised of three categories:
(1) Protection of Intellectual Property Rights, (2) Patent Protection, and (3) Copyright Piracy.
The first category of the IPR component is comprised of survey data from the World Economic
forum and the World Bank Enterprise surveys which contain questions such as: in your country,
to what extent are Intellectual Property Rights protected? Respondents are given a scale of 1-7 to
answer, 7 being extremely protected. The second source comes from evaluating countries’ IPR
laws for their coverage of subject matter, membership in international treaties, restrictions on
patent rights, enforcement mechanisms, and duration of protection. These are scored on a scale
from 1-5, 5 being the strongest. Coverage of subject matter is scored based on whether a country
covers the following areas: pharmaceuticals, chemicals, food, surgical products, microorganisms,
utility models, software, plant and animal varieties, etc. Membership in international treaties
includes the Paris Accords, Patent Cooperation Treaty, Protection of New Varieties (UPOV),
Budapest treaty (microorganism deposits), Trade-related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS).
Enforcement mechanisms include preliminary (pre-trial) injunctions, contributory infringement,
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and burden of proof reversals. Restrictions on patent rights include working requirements,
compulsory licensing, and revocation of patents for violations (Park 2008). The third source the
IPR component synthesizes IPR theft rates in each country from BSA Global Software Survey.
These three sources are combined to create their IPR component of the index and will be used to
measure my second independent variable, IPR strength.
This measure for legal environment and IPR strength will be paired with another large-n
database’s trade data, the World Bank. This organization has data open to the public dating back
to the 1960’s. But, for my research purposes I am only interested in their data that overlaps with
Property Right Alliances’ IPRI index for the past couple years. Unfortunately, the World Bank’s
trade data is incomplete for 2018 and 2019 with most countries not reporting data, thus I am
restricted to using 2017 as the year for my regression analysis. 2017 is the only year that has
complete data from both the IPRI index and the World Bank trade data. I will be using the World
Bank’s “World Development Indicators” catalog which contains import data measured as the
total products and services imported using US$ 2010 constant.
With the more common higher levels of aggregation, the analysis of IPR is
overwhelmingly dominated by using variations of the gravity equation for international trade.
The gravity equation is a robust empirical tool used to analyze more than one country’s trade.
The gravity equation holds that trade between countries is proportional to their sizes, measured
by GDP, and inversely proportional to the distance between the two countries (see equation
below). Scholars have made variations of this well-founded equation to fit their analysis of IPR
and how it affects international trade. Some variables scholars may add to their gravity equation
include ex-colony status, common border, and language (Doanh 2007). After having established
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the imitative effect is a determinant of the market power or expansion effect, scholars have added
imitative ability to their modified equation which started with Smith (2001) (Awokuse 2015).
Gravity Equation: (most simplified form)

The variable Mij is bilateral imports by country i (China) from exporter country j. The variables
Yi and Yj are the incomes (proxied by GDP) for countries. Yw is world income and tij is the
bilateral trade resistance term (measured as one plus the ad valorem trade cost) for trade between
countries i and j. Furthermore, the parameter σ denotes the elasticity of substitution between
different goods. Pi and Pj are the Dixit-Stiglitz CES consumer price indices for countries i and j
(Awokuse 2010). Scholars like Awokuse, Smith, and Falvey use variations of the gravity
equation to fit their specific theories. I am diverging from the current literature in this aspect
because I am not using the gravity equation and instead doing a regression analysis. The data
available to me that I have been able to find is not enough to perform the gravity equation. I do
not have access to the bilateral trade resistance term and the elasticity of substitution.
Additionally, I am more confident in my ability to produce a strong statistical analysis using
bivariate and multivariate regressions. To my understanding, the control variables used for these
analyses include GDP, regional effects, population, and democracy so I will be using the same
control variables. This is a limitation of my study because a multivariate/bivariate regression
may not be as strong of an analysis as other scholars’ versions of the gravity equation; however,
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my study makes up for this weakness by using an updated Property Rights index that includes
more comprehensive factors than previous indexes and more recent data from 2017.
b. Strengths and Weaknesses
The reasons why this analysis provides such strong insight into IPR mechanisms that
affect Sino-US trade are because this research design utilizes strong robust statistical analysis of
the most current and reliable data available. This research design is extremely comprehensive in
its breadth and scope. By first updating previous scholars’ research with a cross-country analysis
of Intellectual Property Rights’ impact on international trade with the most recent data available,
an overarching trend or relationship will become clear. Either this will reinforce the past theories
surrounding IPR or it will provide important differences in which I will address in the discussion
section. With this research, I am placing more importance on gathering a breadth of data from
countries dealing with Intellectual Property Rights to better explain how Sino-US trade relations
have been impacted by China’s evolving IPR strength. With an overarching trend and deep
insight into firm level experiences, policy makers and firm executives will benefit from this
research into an important relationship between businesses and governments.
Even though this research presents an opportunity to expand upon previous research, a
problematic issue is how valid or precise data is from Chinese and US sources including the
discrepancies in reporting trade volume. I plan on paying close attention to conflicting data
which could hurt the validity of this analysis. Despite the possibility for contradictions in data for
the US and China who are competing for the position as the world’s hegemon, it would be
unsurprising that data on both sides could be inaccurate and inflated. Cross-referencing data on
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trade and for the firms will be essential in reinforcing the accuracy of the data I plan on
collecting.
VII.

Data Analysis

I compiled my dataset from the several internationally recognized sources. I collected and
self-entered import, GDP, and population data from the World Bank’s data catalog “World
Development Indicators” (WDI) which compiles data from internationally recognized sources to
present current and accurate global development data. I sourced Intellectual Property Right and
legal environment strength data from the International Property Rights Index which is comprised
of those two indexes plus physical property rights (PPR). I coded the countries available from the
IPR index into different regions according to the United Nations Country Grouping. I also
collected Political Rights and Civil Liberties data to act as a control for democracy from the
Freedom House Reports. After compiling my data set, I had to choose 2017 as the year I would
focus my analysis on because of data restrictions. The World Bank (WDI) data catalog only had
a small selection of countries for 2019 and 2018. Additionally, the International Property Rights
Index only made their data public from 2017-2019, the previous reports did not contain tables
with all the data available.
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The dependent variable is each country’s imports for 2017, measured by the total value of
goods and services in constant 2010 US$. Initially this data was in dollars, but I had to convert it
to millions, billions, then finally trillions to get coefficients that were easier to understand and
graph. Specifically, for Figure 5 which is a scatter plot showing the positive correlation between
imports and IPR strength, the log of the import data had to be taken in order to see the correlation
more clearly. The datapoints were so close together before taking the log, it was unclear what the
significance of the graph was.
Figure 5: Scatter Plot of 2017 IPR Strength vs Import(log)

Source: Author’s Dataset
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The independent variables for my two hypotheses are the strength of a country’s legal
environment and Intellectual Property Rights, measured by two components of the International
Property Rights Index. For how the Intellectual Property Rights and Legal Environment
component of the IPRI index are measured, please see the research design. Compiling this data
was particularly tedious as the reports were only available in pdf format and I could not copy and
paste the data straight into excel so I had to manually enter the data. As shown in Figure 6 below,
and outlined in red, China is ranked in the 3rd quintile among other countries’ IPRI score. The
third quintile includes the top 60% of countries in Property Right Alliance’s index. The United
States, outlined in blue, is ranked in the top 20% of countries. The highest ranked IPRI score
belongs to New Zealand and the lowest ranked score belongs to the Republic of Yemen. Table 1
details the summary statistics and Table 2 details the definition and source of variables.
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Figure 6: 2017 IPRI Report Quintile Rankings of Countries

Source: 2017 IPRI Report
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Variable
Import
IPR
Legal
PPR
IPRI
GDP (log)
Population (log)
Region
Political Rights
Civil Liberties

Obs
121
127
127
127
127
127
127
128
128
128

Source: Author’s Dataset

Mean
.19
5.503
5.171
6.227
5.634
6.16e+11
5.51e+07
3.508
3.227
3.148

Std.Dev.
.399
1.651
1.827
1.366
1.501
1.92e+12
1.74e+08
2.227
2.086
1.721

Min
.002
1.707
1.679
3.26
2.728
2.32e+09
343000
1
1
1

Max
3.07
8.715
9.031
8.826
8.634
1.73e+13
1.39e+09
9
7
7
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I considered a series of control variables to support my analysis including GDP,
population size, region, and democracy. The GDP data was measured in $US dollars and had to
be logged in order to provide clearer results; the same situation for the population size which was
measured in singular individuals. The different regions that I included according to the United
Nations Country Grouping are as follows: Africa, Asia, Central America, Europe, Middle East,
North America, Oceania, South America, and The Caribbean. The democracy control variables
include the Political Rights Index and the Civil Liberties Index from Freedom House. Freedom
house uses a combination of field research, local interviews, news articles, nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs), and regional specialists that go over the analysts’ results. Each country is
scored 0-4 points for each of the 10 political rights indicators and 15 civil liberties indicators. A
score of 0 signifies the smallest degree of freedom and 4 the greatest degree of freedom. For
Political Rights questions there are three categories: (1) Electoral Process (3 questions), (2)
Political Pluralism and Participation (4 questions), and (3) Functioning of Government (3
questions). The Civil Liberties questions are grouped into 4 categories: (1) Freedom of
Expression and Belief (4 Questions), (2) Associational and Organizational Rights (3 questions),
(3) Rule of Law (4 questions), and (4) Personal Autonomy and Individual Rights (4 questions).
See appendix for the specific questions asked.
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Table 2: Variable Definition and Source
Variable
Definition
International
The Index measures the strength of physical property rights,
Property
intellectual property rights, and the legal and political
Rights Index
environments that enforce them.
The Intellectual Property Rights component evaluates the
protection of this kind property. In addition to an opinion-based
measure, it assesses protection of two major forms of intellectual
property rights (patents and copyrights) from a de jure and a de
IPR
facto perspective.
The Legal and Political Environment component grasps the ability
of a nation to enforce a de jure system of property rights. It
comprises four (4) elements: the independence of its judicial
Legal
system, the strength of the rule of law, the control of corruption,
Environment
and the stability of its political system.
A strong property rights regime promotes the confidence of people
in its effectiveness to protect private property rights. It also
provides for integrated transactions related to tj he registry of
property, and it allows access to the required credit to convert
PPR
property into capital.
Gross Domestic Product measures the total value of all goods and
GDP (log)
services produced in a country during a single year, in log form
Population
Population is the number of people residing in the country, in log
(log)
form
Region

Region is the area of the world in which that country resides
Africa (1)
Asia (2)
Central America (3)
Europe (4)
Middle East (5)
North America (6)
Oceania (7)
South America (8)
The Caribbean (9)
Political
Evaluates a country's electoral process, political pluralism and
Rights Index
participation, and functioning of government
Evaluates a country's freedom of expression and belief,
Civil Liberties associational and organizational rights, their rule of law, and
Index
personal autonomy and individual rights to create an index
Source: Author’s Dataset

Source

IPR index

IPR index

IPR index

IPR index
World Bank
World Bank
UN Region
classification

Freedom
House
Freedom
House
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I first performed the bivariate analysis where I regress the dependent variable against key
independent variables and report the results in Table 3. The coefficients for IPR, legal
environment, and the International Property Rights Index are all reported positive and
statistically significant across all model specifications. The coefficient for IPR is positive and
statistically significant, suggesting that higher IPR score is associated with more imports. More
specifically, in the bivariate model, imports increase 120 billion $US (2010) for every 1 point
gained on the IPR scale. In addition, the R-squared test also presents significant change from the
bivariate to multivariate model. As seen in the bivariate table, the R-squared test is equal to 0.24
which means that the bivariate model can attest for around 24% of the effect on imports.

Table 3: Bivariate Regression results
(1)
IPR

0.120***
(0.020)

(2)

(3)

(4)

0.075***
(0.019)

0.074***
(0.019)

IPRI

Obs.
R-squared
Regional Fixed Effect

-0.476***
(0.114)
120
0.240
No

(6)

0.114***
(0.022)
0.455***
(0.132)
120
0.179
No

0.115***
(0.023)
0.450***
(0.134)
120
0.179
Yes

0.121***
(0.020)

legal

Constant

(5)

0.469***
(0.118)
120
0.240
Yes

Source: Author’s Dataset
Note: Robust standard errors are in parenthesis
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.

-0.200*

-0.204*

(0.105)
120
0.117
No

(0.111)
120
0.117
Yes
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Table 4: Multivariate Regression results
(1)
(2)
IPR

0.089***
(0.024)

GDP (Log)
Population (Log)
Political Rights
Civil Liberties
Constant
Obs.
R-squared
Regional Fixed
Effect

0.052**
(0.025)
0.082***
(0.028)
0.062**
(0.030)
-0.072*
(0.040)
-2.948***
(0.761)
119
0.483
No

(4)

0.078***
(0.022)

0.077***
(0.024)

(5)

(6)

0.088***
(0.025)

legal
IPRI

(3)

0.088*** 0.087***
(0.026)
(0.027)
0.053*
0.053**
0.054**
0.056**
0.058**
(0.027)
(0.025)
(0.026)
(0.025)
(0.027)
0.081** 0.105*** 0.104*** 0.090***
0.087**
(0.033)
(0.032)
(0.037)
(0.031)
(0.035)
0.061*
0.063**
0.063*
0.065**
0.064**
(0.031)
(0.031)
(0.033)
(0.031)
(0.032)
-0.072*
-0.077*
-0.077*
-0.083**
-0.082*
(0.040)
(0.043)
(0.043)
(0.041)
(0.042)
-2.949*** -3.271*** -3.271*** -3.150*** -3.153***
(0.760)
(0.799)
(0.802)
(0.784)
(0.785)
119
119
119
119
119
0.483
0.474
0.474
0.474
0.474
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes

Source: Author’s Dataset
Note: Robust standard errors are in parenthesis
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

The results for the multivariate model regressions are reported in table 4. It should be noted that
the coefficient for IPR changes in the multivariate model when all the controls are added. The
multivariate model says that for every one-point increase on the IPR scale, a country’s imports
increase on average about 88 billion US$ 2010. In comparison, increasing 1-point on the legal
environment scale shows an average increase of about 77 billion US$ in imports; This effect is
about 10 billion less than IPR’s effect on imports. Additionally, the effect of IPR strength on
imports according to the R-squared test statistic accounts for about 48% of the variability of the
data around its mean.
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Seeing that China and the US have much higher imports than my regression equation
predicts, I preformed additional regression analysis without Chinese and US data to see if the
significant and positive relationship still exists without the Sino-US relationship present in the
dataset. The results for this analysis are reported in tables 5 and 6 in the appendix. It is important
to note that the bivariate and multivariate results without China and the US are both positive and
statistically significant. The IPR coefficient is reported as an average increase of $95 billion in
imports per point increase in IPR in the bivariate results and $74 billion in the multivariate
results. The Legal coefficient is reported as an average increase of $63 billion in imports per
point increase in Legal score and $62 billion in the multivariate model. Lastly, the IPRI index’s
coefficient is reported as an average increase of $90 billion in imports per point increase in the
entire index score and $70 billion in the multivariate model. Comparing this analysis with my
original analysis which included China and the US, the results without the Sino-US relationship
show positive and statistically significant coefficients for IPR, Legal, and IPRI that are smaller
on average.
Since the results from my quantitative cross-country analysis of the effect of Intellectual
Property Rights and Legal environment on a country’s imports show positive and statistically
significant coefficients, they support both of my hypotheses that increasing IPR and Legal
strength will lead to an increase in imports. Additionally, these results support that on average
increasing IPR strength can be associated with a market expansion effect and supports Smith
(2000, 2001) and Awokuse (2010) in their analysis of market expansion and market power
effects specifically in China.
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VIII. Discussion
My research results update the current literature by using data pulled from 2017, the most
recent study done on IPR that I have found. Awokuse (2010a) specifically studies the effect of
strengthening patent laws which led to an increase in imports for China. The effect observed was
particularly strong for knowledge-intensive products. Awokuse was able to procur industry level
data that I was not and was therefore able to analyze IPR’s effect on specific industries. My
research supports the overall trend that increasing IPR strength increases imports in broader and
even more comprehensive ways, further strengthening Awokuses and other researchers’ findings.
Awokuse used 36 countries which consisted of 21 OECD countries and the rest non-OECD
countries, focusing specifically on China’s import levels. My cross-country analysis used IPR
and import data from over 100 countries and still observed comparable results suggesting that
this association of IPR and imports can be extended to more than just China and the other
countries Awokuse included. It would be interesting to see in the future if more recent industrylevel data becomes available that the same effect will be observed in our constantly changing
world. One important difference between our studies is that Awokuse used the number of foreign
patent applications as a proxy for IPR strength under the assumption that more applications and
patents would be because their IPR system is getting better. My research model used an IPR
index that combined both data from patents and copyrights to calculate a country’s score. This
means that my results include more aspects of Intellectual Property Rights and shows positive
and significant results for a wide range of countries.
Another prominent researcher of IPR, Smith (2001, 2002), found that stronger foreign
patent rights lead to an increase in US drug exports, the market expansion effect, to countries
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with strong imitative ability and decrease exports to countries with weak imitative ability,
consistent with the market power effect. China is considered as a country with strong imitative
ability and thus would experience a market expansion effect of imports. Smith’s studies are
consistent with my results in that market expansion effect is observed more than the market
power effect. However, Smith in her 2002 study focused specifically on biological products,
medicinal, botanicals, and pharmaceuticals whereas my research is not industry specific. These
industries fall into the knowledge-intensive category that other researchers find to have a positive
relationship with IPR strength.
Some specific results that I found to be unexpected are in the multivariate regression
analysis, the Civil Liberties control variable has a negative coefficient and the Political Rights
variable has a positive coefficient and are both statistically significant, though not as significant
as my independent variables. The Political Rights and Civil Liberties indexes are on a number
scale with 1 being the strongest individual rights and liberties. This led me to believe that both
control variables would have negative coefficients when regressed with imports. This
observation would need additional analysis, possibly for a future study, whether political rights
for individuals have any influence on the imports of a country.
Seeing that the positive and statistically significant relationship between imports and a
country’s IPR and Legal Environment stays positive and significant when the Sino-US
relationship is excluded, the data can speak to this important economic relationship as well. The
initial scatter plot shows China and the US as having much higher import levels than the line of
best fit. This observation suggests that the regression results containing the Sino-US relationship
may be skewed. However, because the same relationship is maintained without the Sino-US
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relationship, my results remain statistically significant and impact both China and the US. My
regression results including the Sino-US trade relationship predict that China’s imports will
increase $88 billion dollars in 2010 USD if they increase their IPR score 1 point. My regression
results without the Sino-US relationship predict that a country’s imports will increase $74 billion
2010 USD. It’s possible that the Sino-US relationship is responsible for the $14 billion
difference in these regression results.
My results add to this literature that the overall legal environment is also associated with
an increase in imports which I have not seen in IPR literature thus far. This means that as China
expands its legal system to include more IPR courts with trained lawyers and judges in this
specific area of law, they will see more international corporations want to sell their products and
services in China. My assumption is that these firms are more confident in the Chinese legal
system as it grows to handle IPR theft situations correctly and timely. If time permitted, my
original thesis plan was to incorporate firm-level case studies that explore this idea more in
depth. However, I was unable to find enough data and put together a strong case study to add.
Even though I had to cut the second part of my thesis, the results of my quantitative
cross-country analysis point to a significant trend that could affect both international and
domestic businesses in different ways. Knowing that an increase in the strength of a country’s
IPR laws and legal environment results in an average increase in imports, international
businesses can use this knowledge to factor in where they choose to do business or not to. If an
international business is operating in China right now selling computer chips and the company
lawyers or employees notice the Chinese government is revamping a part of their IPR structure,
my research shows that if the change would increase the strength of their IPR laws according to
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the IPRI index, then the business should prepare for an increase in imports to the Chinese
market. My results do not show which imports specifically will increase or from which
international actors, nonetheless a company should take those changes into account when
deciding how to operate in the near future. From previous research, changes in IPR law effects
knowledge-intensive industries more so than others, which would mean the computer chip
company might see increased competition from other knowledge-intensive industries or have the
opportunity to increase their own exports to China. These implications are speculative examples
and would be better supported with future firm-level case studies done on individual firms.
However, it is important for businesses to consider how an increase in imports could affect their
particular situations. Domestic businesses could have entirely different experiences with the
increasing strength of their own country’s IPR and legal environment strength. Depending on the
domestic company’s industry, an increase in IPR strength and the resulting increase in imports
could provide the domestic company with better protection for its own technology and
information; however, an increase in imports could mean increased and possibly unwanted
competition from powerful international corporations.
An increase in imports has implications for country’s governments as well, if they change
their IPR laws or legal environment they need to prepare for an increase in imports or create
policies and structures that will restrict or support an influx of imports. An increase in imports
due to the expansion of import quotas can have a negative impact on domestic producers because
of resulting lower domestic prices and production (Kennedy 2009). That potential impact on
domestic businesses needs to be addressed by governments who are inclined to support their
country’s firms. Knowing that IPR, legal environment, and a country’s imports are connected
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with a positive relationship, governments can predict more accurately how much their market’s
imports could increase on average when they implement improvements to their legal system.
Government leaders can therefore prepare for the inevitable influx of imports, proactively
choosing whether they want to support this increase or restrict it with quotas, tariffs, and other
trade barriers.
This relationship between IPR, legal environment, and imports only points to an average
increase in imports, each country will have a different experience, especially China. The Chinese
economy is an export-growth based economy whose growth rate has slowed in the most recent
decade; however, with the continued implementation of the Belt and Road Initiative, China may
continue to expand its exports along those newly constructed trade routes (Athukorala 2017).
Along with China’s economic growth and recent slow-down, they have joined the World Trade
Organization and the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights Agreement which
both required China to strengthen their Intellectual Property Right legislation to satisfy
international standards (Li 2015). According to my research results, China should continue to
experience increased levels of imports if they continue to expand their IPR protections and
enforcement.
The US on the other hand is a major influencer upon less developed countries to
implement and enforce higher standards in IPR laws. This influence, according to my research in
addition to previous IPR literature may be because increasing the strength of IPR laws leads to
more imports in any given country’s market, without the interference of tariffs, quotas, and other
trade barriers. The US has been pressuring specifically China to address the high levels of IP
theft and technology theft reported by US companies in China (Chen 2014). This pressure and
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changes to Chinese IPR legislation if following the trend my research points to, China will
experience a growth in imports. This may be beneficial for the US and other western nations
looking to turn the balance on Chinese import competition who can take advantage of this trend.
However, less developed countries may not benefit from such a shock to their market. Less
developed nations could face unfair competition from large multinational corporations who
monopolize less developed nations’ markets (Chang 2009). For that reason, these nations might
impose high tariffs, quotas, and huge protections for their domestic businesses to shield them
from international competition. For the US, focusing on China’s growth in IPR strength could
benefit their trade relationship in the long-term.
The US and Chinese economies are interdependent yet currently at odds because of the
US’ slow decline as the world hegemon, a process highlighted by the Sino-US trade war and IPR
being just one thread in this complex and perpetually shifting relationship. IPR is one current
source of tension between the US and Chinese government that according to the current literature
and my research results could influence the US trade deficit with China. Unfortunately, my
research results cannot predict whether increasing IPR and legal environment strength will
balance the trade deficit, nor does it predict what future tariffs, quotas, and other trade barriers
will be at play. My research suggests that the strength of China’s IPR and legal environment can
be associated with increased imports without other variables changing or impacting the
relationship. Perhaps this trend will result in a pressure on the Chinese market to allow for more
imports; however, the Chinese government can block this pressure from having any real change.
For the future of the Sino-US trade relationship, IPR will continue to provide an avenue for
diplomacy as I have shown its importance to bilateral trade.
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After interpreting and discussing implications of my research, I offer some policy
suggestions for both the US and Chinese governments to reduce tensions and work towards
cooperative economic benefit. First, in current times the Coronavirus pandemic overshadows the
economic tensions in the Sino-US trade relationship. However, after this crisis subsides and the
two economies recover, the trade deficit and IPR factor will still be relevant. Thus, I offer some
suggestions of waiting until after the pandemic and economic recovery to bring both leaders
together to have an open discussion about fair and equal trade. If the US’ goal is to restrict
China’s growth, US government leaders should closely track the status of the Belt and Road
initiative projects and investments. Additionally, the US could continue to use outside pressure
including the World Trade Organization, TRIPS, and other international
agreements/organizations to pressure China into expediting its IPR growth.
To accompany a cross-country analysis of IPR’s current impact on international trade, a
possible future study, given the availability of data, would be to analyze Chinese IPR strength’s
relationship with Sino-US trade by conducting firm level case studies of the Chinese company
Huawei and the US company Boeing. My original thesis plan was going to include qualitative
case studies; however, due to time constraints, lack of available data, and other circumstantial
factors I was unable to produce significant enough case studies to include in this thesis. Despite
the limitations, I will provide this as a suggestion for a future researcher to use. Previous
scholarship surrounding IPR has been floating at remarkably high levels of aggregation, which
loses important details from the decision makers involved in both Intellectual Property Rights
and trade. Policies have significant economic impact, but firms are ultimately the entities
deciding whether to increase or decrease exports and imports. In addition, broad scope analyses
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of IPR and trade are useful for generalizability and being able to see trends that are not bound by
one country’s situation. However, in order to explain the variations found in previous
scholarship, one could look at firm level data that potentially explains with greater detail the
impact IPR has on Sino-US trade.
IX. Conclusion
This thesis aimed to understand deeper the economic relationship between the US and
China through Intellectual Property Rights as the mechanism that operates between the two. My
main research questions were targeted at discovering how IPR influences bilateral trade between
countries. Based on my quantitative cross-country study of over 100 countries using bivariate
and multivariate regression analysis, taking into consideration the current literature, my
conclusion is that IPR laws and the strength of a country’s legal environment has a considerable
effect on the amount of imports a country receives. Both an increase in IPR strength and legal
environment can be associated with an increase in imports, although IPR has a larger effect than
legal environment.
China and the US have been experiencing increased tensions in the past decade in part
due to the US’ relative power decreasing in the international order, the enormous trade deficit
between US and China, and China’s continued expansion through the Belt and Road Initiative.
The US seems to be acting on these tensions by engaging in a trade war with China and
addressing other trade-related practices through international organizations to rebalance the
situation and contain Chinese growth. To understand these tensions and the shifts in power
relations, my thesis looks at one major point of contention between the two countries which I
theorized would have a considerable impact on the Sino-US trade relationship, Intellectual
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Property Rights. US companies have reported a high frequency of Intellectual Property theft in
China by domestic Chinese firms which has been taken up by US diplomacy with China. The US
has been putting pressure on China and even have submitted a complaint to the WTO about
China’s subpar IPR practices. It should be noted that Chinese IPR was only created in 1980’s
and has continued to develop and increase in strength since then. China has been able to satisfy
international standards and join the WTO and other international organizations in such a short
time. Nonetheless, China’s IPR system still has a lot of room for improvement considering they
are one of the world’s largest economies.
Previous scholarship on IPR has shown that there is a considerable impact on
international trade in various forms including but not limited to: exports, imports, FDI,
innovation, licensing, etc. Most notably is that knowledge intensive industries experience the
strongest impact from changes in IPR strength. My research was not industry specific, but it
serves as an important update to the current literature and expands the comprehensiveness of
countries, adds a legal environment variable, and further supports that the market expansion
effect is on average more frequent than the market power effect. By using the most recent IPR
and trade data available, my thesis strengthens what is already known about the effects of IPR on
international trade. It solidifies not only the theory that IPR effect trade, but the overall quality
and quantity of legal structures, institutions, and enforcement practices also contribute to changes
in international trade.
The implications of my research results, as mentioned previously in the discussion
section, has various impacts on international and domestic businesses, on countries, and on the
Sino-US trade relationship. For businesses, this knowledge is particularly important for
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international business who can predict more accurately how their competition in a foreign market
may fluctuate as they monitor changes in the target country’s IPR and legal system. For domestic
businesses, they can better prepare and focus on their comparative advantages. Countries who
are revamping their IPR laws to join international trade organizations or improve their legal
system can better comprehend how these changes will affect their economies so they can prepare
tariffs, quotas, and other trade policies to handle the increased pressure for imports. Implications
for the Sino-US trade relationship are that IPR will continue to be a point of contention between
the two economic powerhouses and could have a considerable impact on the trade imbalance.
The US’ pressure on China to increase their IPR strength could alleviate some troubles for US
companies that are trying to do business there. Overall, the Sino-US trade relationship remains a
complex and not completely understood web of components, requiring countless future studies
as more data becomes available; however my thesis adds clarity and joins the current literature in
pursuing the truth surrounding one of the most important economic relationships in the world.

Chester 45

X. Appendix

Table 5: Bivariate Regression results without China and US
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
IPR

0.094***
(0.017)

_cons

0.063***
(0.015)

Obs.
R-squared
Regional Fixed
Effect

-0.366***
(0.081)
118
0.350
No

(6)

0.096***
(0.018)

Legal
IPRI

(5)

0.063***
(0.015)

0.089*** 0.091***
(0.018)
(0.019)
-0.352*** -0.176*** -0.176*** -0.352*** -0.341***
(0.080)
(0.061)
(0.061)
(0.089)
(0.088)
118
118
118
118
118
0.353
0.202
0.202
0.266
0.270
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes

Source: Author’s Dataset
Standard errors are in parenthesis
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 6: Multivariate Regression results without China and US
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
IPR

0.075***
(0.018)

Legal

GDP (Log)
Population (Log)
Political Rights
Civil Liberties
_cons
Obs.

0.028*
(0.017)
0.053***
(0.016)
0.026
(0.016)
-0.037
(0.024)
-1.815***
(0.346)
117

(6)

0.073***
(0.018)
0.063***
(0.019)

IPRI

(5)

0.061***
(0.020)

0.071*** 0.069***
(0.021)
(0.021)
0.033*
0.031*
0.036
0.033*
0.039*
(0.019)
(0.019)
(0.022)
(0.019)
(0.022)
0.049*** 0.071*** 0.066*** 0.058*** 0.052***
(0.017)
(0.021)
(0.023)
(0.019)
(0.020)
0.025
0.028
0.026
0.029*
0.027
(0.016)
(0.017)
(0.018)
(0.017)
(0.017)
-0.037
-0.042
-0.042
-0.047*
-0.046*
(0.025)
(0.026)
(0.027)
(0.025)
(0.026)
-1.824*** -2.094*** -2.095*** -1.992*** -1.999***
(0.352)
(0.381)
(0.383)
(0.370)
(0.373)
117
117
117
117
117
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R-squared
Regional Fixed
Effect

0.538
No

0.541
Yes

0.515
No

0.518
Yes

0.514
No

0.519
Yes

Source: Author’s
Dataset
Standard errors are
in parenthesis
*** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1

Freedom House Political Rights and Civil Liberties Indexes Questions
POLITICAL RIGHTS (0–40 POINTS)
ELECTORAL PROCESS (0–12 POINTS)
1. Is the head of government or other chief national authority elected through free and fair
elections?
2. Did established and reputable national and/or international election monitoring
organizations judge the most recent elections for head of government to be free and fair?
(Note: Heads of government chosen through various electoral frameworks, including
direct elections for president, indirect elections for prime minister by parliament, and the
electoral college system for electing presidents, are covered under this and the following
subquestions. In cases of indirect elections for the head of government, the elections for
the legislature that chose the head of government, as well as the selection process of the
head of government himself, should be taken into consideration.)
3. Have there been undue, politically motivated delays in holding the most recent
election for head of government?
4. Is the registration of voters and candidates conducted in an accurate, timely,
transparent, and nondiscriminatory manner?
5. Can candidates make speeches, hold public meetings, and enjoy media access
throughout the campaign free of intimidation?
1. Does voting take place by secret ballot or by equivalent free voting procedure?
2. Are voters able to vote for the candidate or party of their choice without undue pressure
or intimidation?
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3. Is the vote count transparent, and is it reported honestly with the official results made
public? Can election monitors from independent groups and representing
parties/candidates watch the counting of votes to ensure their honesty?
4. Is each person’s vote given equivalent weight to those of other voters in order to ensure
equal representation?
5. Has a democratically elected head of government who was chosen in the most recent
election subsequently been overthrown in a violent coup? (Note: Although a peaceful,
“velvet coup” may ultimately lead to a positive outcome—particularly if it replaces a
head of government who was not freely and fairly elected—the new leader has not been
freely and fairly elected and cannot be treated as such.)
6. In cases where elections for regional, provincial, or state governors and/or other
subnational officials differ significantly in conduct from national elections, does the
conduct of the subnational elections reflect an opening toward improved political rights
in the country, or, alternatively, a worsening of political rights?
7. Are the national legislative representatives elected through free and fair elections?
8. Did established and reputable domestic and/or international election monitoring
organizations judge the most recent national legislative elections to be free and fair?
9. Have there been undue, politically motivated delays in holding the most recent national
legislative election?
10. Is the registration of voters and candidates conducted in an accurate, timely, transparent,
and nondiscriminatory manner?
11. Can candidates make speeches, hold public meetings, and enjoy media access throughout
the campaign free of intimidation?
12. Does voting take place by secret ballot or by equivalent free voting procedure?
13. Are voters able to vote for the candidate or party of their choice without undue pressure
or intimidation?
14. Is the vote count transparent, and is it reported honestly with the official results
15. made public? Can election monitors from independent groups and representing
16. parties/candidates watch the counting of votes to ensure their honesty?
17. Is each person’s vote given equivalent weight to those of other voters in order to ensure
equal representation?
18. Have the representatives of a democratically elected national legislature who were chosen
in the most recent election subsequently been overthrown in a violent coup? (Note:
Although a peaceful, “velvet coup” may ultimately lead to a positive outcome—
particularly if it replaces a national legislature whose representatives were not freely and
fairly elected—members of the new legislature have not been freely and fairly elected
and cannot be treated as such.)
19. In cases where elections for subnational councils/parliaments differ significantly in
conduct from national elections, does the conduct of the subnational elections reflect an
opening toward improved political rights in the country, or, alternatively, a worsening of
political rights?
20. Are the electoral laws and framework fair?
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21. Is there a clear, detailed, and fair legislative framework for conducting elections? (Note:
Changes to electoral laws should not be made immediately preceding an election if the
ability of voters, candidates, or parties to fulfill their roles in the election is infringed.)
22. Are election commissions or other election authorities independent and free from
government or other pressure and interference?
23. Is the composition of election commissions fair and balanced?
24. Do election commissions or other election authorities conduct their work in an effective
and competent manner?
25. Do adult citizens enjoy universal and equal suffrage? (Note: Suffrage can be suspended
or withdrawn for reasons of legal incapacity, such as mental incapacity or conviction of a
serious criminal offense.) Is the drawing of election districts conducted in a fair and
nonpartisan manner, as opposed to gerrymandering for personal or partisan advantage?
26. Has the selection of a system for choosing legislative representatives (such as
proportional versus majoritarian) been manipulated to advance certain political interests
or to influence the electoral results?
B. POLITICAL PLURALISM AND PARTICIPATION (0–16 POINTS)
1. Do the people have the right to organize in different political parties or other
competitive political groupings of their choice, and is the system open to the rise and fall of these
competing parties or groupings?
•
•
•

Do political parties encounter undue legal or practical obstacles in their efforts to
be formed and to operate, including onerous registration requirements,
excessively large membership requirements, etc.?
Do parties face discriminatory or onerous restrictions in holding meetings, rallies,
or other peaceful activities?
Are party members or leaders intimidated, harassed, arrested, imprisoned, or
subjected to violent attacks as a result of their peaceful political activities?

6. Is there a significant opposition vote and a realistic opportunity for the opposition to
increase its support or gain power through elections?
•
•
•

Are various legal/administrative restrictions selectively applied to opposition
parties to prevent them from increasing their support base or successfully
competing in elections?
Are there legitimate opposition forces in positions of authority, such as in the
national legislature or in subnational governments?
Are opposition party members or leaders intimidated, harassed, arrested,
imprisoned, or subjected to violent attacks as a result of their peaceful political
activities?
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3. Are the people’s political choices free from domination by the military, foreign
powers, totalitarian parties, religious hierarchies, economic oligarchies, or any other powerful
group?
•
•
•
•

Do such groups offer bribes to voters and/or political figures in order to influence
their political choices?
Do such groups intimidate, harass, or attack voters and/or political figures in order
to influence their political choices?
Does the military control or enjoy a preponderant influence over government
policy and activities, including in countries that nominally are under civilian
control?
Do foreign governments control or enjoy a preponderant influence over
government policy and activities by means including the presence of foreign
military troops, the use of significant economic threats or sanctions, etc.?

7. Do cultural, ethnic, religious, or other minority groups have full political rights and
electoral opportunities?
•
•
•

Do political parties of various ideological persuasions address issues of specific
concern to minority groups?
Does the government inhibit the participation of minority groups in national or
subnational political life through laws and/or practical obstacles?
Are political parties based on ethnicity, culture, or religion that espouse peaceful,
democratic values legally permitted and de facto allowed to operate?

C. FUNCTIONING OF GOVERNMENT (0–12 POINTS)
1. Do the freely elected head of government and national legislative representatives
determine the policies of the government?
•
•
•

Are the candidates who were elected freely and fairly duly installed in office?
Do other appointed or non–freely elected state actors interfere with or prevent
freely elected representatives from adopting and implementing legislation and
making meaningful policy decisions?
Do nonstate actors, including criminal gangs, the military, and foreign
governments, interfere with or prevent elected representatives from adopting and
implementing legislation and making meaningful policy decisions?

2. Is the government free from pervasive corruption?
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•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Has the government implemented effective anticorruption laws or programs to
prevent, detect, and punish corruption among public officials, including conflict
of interest?
Is the government free from excessive bureaucratic regulations, registration
requirements, or other controls that increase opportunities for corruption?
Are there independent and effective auditing and investigative bodies that
function without impediment or political pressure or influence?
Are allegations of corruption by government officials thoroughly investigated and
prosecuted without prejudice, particularly against political opponents?
Are allegations of corruption given wide and extensive airing in the media?
Do whistle-blowers, anticorruption activists, investigators, and journalists enjoy
legal protections that make them feel secure about reporting cases of bribery and
corruption?
What was the latest Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index
score for this country?

3. Is the government accountable to the electorate between elections, and does it operate
with openness and transparency?
•
•
•
•
•
•

Are civil society groups, interest groups, journalists, and other citizens able to
comment on and influence pending policies or legislation?
Do citizens have the legal right and practical ability to obtain information about
government operations and the means to petition government agencies for it?
Is the budget-making process subject to meaningful legislative review and public
scrutiny?
Does the government publish detailed accounting expenditures in a timely
fashion?
Does the state ensure transparency and effective competition in the awarding of
government contracts?
Are the asset declarations of government officials open to public and media
scrutiny and verification?
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